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Protestantism and the Academic Study of American Religion
An Enduring Alliance
As I indicated in the Introduction, and as now should be clear, this book is about several things at once. One goal has been to o=er answers to questions that have not previously been raised about American religion (like "How did the Irish become Protestant in America?"). Another has been to provide new answers to old questions (like "Why did Irish American Catholics become the mainstay of the American church?" and "Why did Italian American Catholics stage festas in honor of the saints and madonnas associated with their villages in Italy?"). Still another has been to show the value of theoretical perspectives-like the "doing gender" approach-that have so far been underutilized in the study of American religion. And in some cases, the goal has been to show that much of what we think we know about American religion is illusory and not at all rooted in the evidence.
In pursuing all these goals, what has also emerged is an argument-made most forcefully at the end of Chapter 3 and in Chapter 5-that the wrong turns and blind alleys we have encountered in reviewing the scholarly study of American religion derive from a longstanding and continuing intellectual orientation that is ultimately Protestant in origin. The claim being made is that the scholarly study of American religion is still very much in the grip of a Protestant imagination. In this chapter, I want to look at the historical origins of this Protestant imagination and at the ways it continues to shape the academic study of American religion, even when there are no Catholics in sight.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the academic study of American religion was shaped by two distinct but mutually reinforcing intellectual traditions. The >rst was a social evolutionary perspective that had been imported from Europe and that was concerned with two questions, namely: how had religion come into existence, and how had it developed with the advance of civilization? The European scholars working in this tradition proposed a range of answers to the >rst of these questions. John Lubbock, Herbert Spencer, and Edward Tylor, for example, suggested that religion had >rst come into existence as primitive peoples sought to make sense of the dream experience; Max Müller suggested that religious belief (at least, Indo-European religious beliefs) had developed when metaphors describing natural phenomena had come to be taken literally; and Emile Durkheim argued that primitive religion was a response to the feelings of psychic e=ervescence generated when clan members gathered to engage common rituals.
1 But, while they gave di=erent answers in explaining the origin of religion, these same European theorists were in general agreement on the answer to the second question: primitive religion, they all believed, had been pervaded by an emphasis on the concrete and on this-worldly concerns, and social evolutionary progress in the religious realm meant movement away from what was concrete and this-worldly toward forms of religion that emphasized a transcendent God and deeply internalized ethical codes. Social evolutionary arguments in general were popular in Western societies during the nineteenth century, as Robert Connell (1997, 20) and others have suggested, because the always-present distinction between "primitive" and "advanced" cultures functioned to legitimize the overseas colonization projects of European powers like France, England, and Germany and the internal colonization projects of countries like the United States. But this particular social evolutionary argument, which saw reliance on material objects as a sign of religious primitiveness, was also appealing, at least in Protestant societies like Britain and the United States, because of its a;nity with the Protestant worldview. After all, from the time of the Reformation forward, the Protestant degradation narrative (encountered in Chapter 3) portrayed Christianity as originally a pristine religion strongly focused on a transcendental God and ethical teachings but claimed that over time the Roman Catholic Church had allowed superstition and pagan elements to creep into Christian practice. Further, in pointing to examples of Catholic activities that were pervaded by superstitious and pagan elements, Protestant commentators had always pointed most of all to Catholic cults focused on physical objects (like images and relics) and the rituals (like pilgrimages) associated with these cults. The social evolutionary perspective on religion, then, in seeing movement away from an emphasis on the concrete as a sign of religious progress, gave a theoretical legitimacy to this older Protestant narrative. Phrased differently, the social evolutionary approach to religion in e=ect transformed the Protestant degradation narrative, originally just a historical account about Christianity, into an ahistorical and universal theory that functioned to validate Protes-tant superiority over both Catholicism and most of the (other) religions ?ourishing in the non-Western world.
In American academic circles, the social evolutionary approach to religion had the greatest impact in the newly emerging discipline of psychology, especially through the work of G. Stanley Hall (1844 Hall ( -1924 , president of Clark University, and Edwin Starbuck (1876 Starbuck ( -1947 .
2 What allowed social evolutionism to creep into their psychology of religion was the view, held by both scholars, that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. Thus, said Starbuck (1907, 193) , "The study of the mental life of children and the epochs through which they pass is doing its part in making indubitable the law that the individual recapitulates in itself the history of the race." Hall routinely said the same thing (see especially the Introduction in Hall 1915). In regard to religion, what this meant is that the religious development of the individual went through stages similar to those associated with the transition from the religion of primitive societies to the religion of advanced societies. Both Hall and Starbuck asserted that religious sentiment in children was characterized by an emphasis on the self and self-interest, on the concrete, and on rules and regulations imposed externally. By contrast, religious sentiment in the mature adult consisted in a deeply internalized "craving for righteousness, a desire to be all and do all for the glory of God and the service of man" (Starbuck 1912, 394) . In retrospect, of course, it seems clear that what both Hall and Starbuck saw to be "mature" religiosity was little more than the sort of religiosity being promoted by liberal Protestant denominations of the period. Starbuck, it should be noted, sometimes came close to understanding the Protestant roots of his conceptualization. He studied the "conversion experience"-which is what he and Hall called the process by which individuals made the transition to mature religiosity-by distributing a questionnaire to a sample of 1,265 people. To his credit, he noted that since almost all his subjects were Protestant, his conclusions about the conversion experience might or might not apply to other religious groups (Starbuck 1912, 25) . Even so, neither Starbuck nor Hall ever questioned the implicit premise that pervaded all their work, namely, that liberal Protestantism, with its emphasis on a transcendent God and service to humanity, epitomized the endpoint of both social evolution and psychological development.
Still, although the social evolutionary perspective on religion developed by European theorists, and the corresponding theories of religious development formulated by American psychologists like Hall and Starbuck, helped to create an academic climate in the United States that privileged Protestantism in the study of religion, it was really another and far more home-grown approach to religion which most ensured that Protestantism became, to borrow again from Robert Orsi (2004, 399) , "the hidden norm of the academic study of religion" in the United States. This second approach is what Catherine Albanese (2002; 2004) Because the consensus model put Protestantism and its links to American democracy front and center in academic discussions of American religion, scholars writing under the in?uence of this model paid little attention to groups outside the Protestant mainstream. Baird's (1844) Religion in the United States of America, for example, a book which is more than 700 pages in length, devotes only four pages to American Catholics. Bacon's (1897) A History of American Christianity devotes a bit more attention to Catholics here and there throughout his discussion but nothing like what you would expect, given the number of Catholics living in the United States at the time. But perhaps the most important consequence of the consensus model for the study of Catholicism was that the model's logic dictated how the study of American Catholics should proceed, to the extent that Catholics were mentioned at all.
Starting from the premise that there was a perfect >t between American Protestantism and American democracy, the obvious question to ask in the case of other denominations and religions-especially in the case of Catholicism, which was accounting for a larger and larger share of the American population-is to what extent these other groups fell short of this perfect >t. Within the logic of the consensus model, the question that had to be asked of American Catholics was whether they could be good Americans or whether, instead, their Catholicism and their growing numbers posed a threat to the Republic.
Interestingly, when discussing whether or not Catholics were a threat to American institutions, Protestant scholars took notice, at least implicitly, of the changing composition of the Catholic population in the United States. Baird was writing at a time (1844) when nativist groups saw Catholics-Irish Catholics in particular-to be a threat to democratic institutions, mainly because they saw Catholics as unthinkingly obedient to their priests, who in turn followed orders issued by the pope. During the period of increasing Irish immigration, Catholics were popularly seen, in other words, to have an allegiance to a foreign ruler. Accordingly, this was the only issue that Baird raised when discussing the Catholic threat. Thus, he (p. 616) says, the suggestion that Catholics "can never be safe citizens of a republic . . . must rest, I should think, on the presumed hatred of the priests to republican institutions and the impossibility of controlling the in-?uence they possess over their people." While Baird went on to express some skepticism about the matter of priestly in?uence over ordinary Catholics, the point is that he, like the nativists, framed the issue in these terms.
By the turn of the century, however, while the Irish were still a plurality within the American Catholic Church, other groups-notably the Italians-were looming larger and larger in popular thinking about American Catholicism. Whatever they might think about the Irish, even the most hostile Protestant commentator could not construct Italian American Catholics as a threat to American democracy on the ground that they owed their allegiance to the pope. Quite the contrary, as we saw in Chapter 3, the "Italian problem" within the American Catholic Church was precisely that they were seen not to be under the control of their local priests or the pope. As a consequence, the emphasis on priestly in?uence when discussing the relationship between Catholicism and American democracy (and this issue did remain central to academic discussions of Catholicism) gave way to a more general assessment of the >t between Catholicism and American cultural values. Bacon (1897, 320-332) , for example, declared that while the Catholic Church in other areas (he names Spain, Mexico, and Italy) was clearly antidemocratic, Catholics in America had the potential to "revolutionize" (his term) their Catholicism by putting less emphasis on symbols and sacrament and more on the >gure of Christ (read: by becoming more like the Protestant sects who took up most of Bacon's discussion).
Turning Points and the New/Old Approach to American Religion
All commentators agree that the consensus model, with its focus on mainstream Protestantism and its tendency to ignore other groups, became less popular during the 1960s and 1970s and that, simultaneously, scholars came more and more to focus on religious diversity when studying American religion. The issue of why this happened is a matter of debate. Early on, Sydney Ahlstrom (1970, (234) (235) suggested that historians during the 1960s were sensitized to the matter of religious diversity partly because religious diversity had become more of a fact in American society and partly because of the many and various changes (some having little to do with religion) taking place in American society during that period. Thomas Tweed would later make the same argument (1997b). For David Hackett (1995) the breakdown of the consensus model derived from the in?uence of social historians like E. P. Thomson and Eugene Genovese and anthropologists like Cli=ord Geertz, whose works collectively fostered a greater interest in popular religion as opposed to the older interest in formal theology and established churches. Charles Cohen (1997, 697) suggests that the shift to an emphasis on diversity occurred when historians turned their attention from books and diaries written by New Englanders to more mundane sources (like court depositions, inventories, pottery, etc.) associated with other American regions. For Catherine Albanese (2002, 6 ) the shift was prompted mainly by the distrust of grand narratives bred into younger scholars by postmodernism and postcolonialism. Needless to say, these various explanations are not mutually exclusive.
But, if the consensus model is gone, what has emerged to take its place? Nothing yet, at least no new model. Instead, as Wilson (2003, 33) observes, the academic study of American religion over the past two decades has been guided by two separate impulses:
One is the approach to American religious history that undertook to make the case that multiple narratives should replace a master narrative; the other is the approach that took seriously studies of religion among social scientists that propose how useful generic mechanisms or common dynamics can be to interpret American (as well as extra-American) religious phenomena.
The goal of scholars writing in what Wilson here calls the "multiple narratives" approach (his "social science" approach will be considered later) is to create accounts of particular groups that are very much tied to particular social and historical contexts. In introducing a collection of readings intended to present the new multiple narratives scholarship as forcefully as possible, Hackett (1995, ix) makes clear just how diverse the literature in this area has become:
During the 1980s, and up to the present, the thrust of this [new] work has dramatically expanded the area of research. Regional religious stories of the West and the South are coming into view. Native American religious history, non-existent as a >eld until the 1980s, is an exciting and rapidly emerging new discipline. Dramatic And indeed, each of the groups that Hackett mentions here (and others) are the subject of one or more of the twenty-six essays included in his reader. Other popular readers organized around the new multiple narratives tradition include Tweed's (1997b) Retelling U.S. Religious History and Orsi's (1999) Gods of the City.
And yet, although an emphasis on diversity is now undeniably central to the study of American religion, have the underlying conceptual frameworks being used really changed all that much? As regards the study of American Catholics, which has been a special concern in this book, there are grounds for doubt. As a start, it is still the case that Catholics are not taken as the object of study in mainstream journals dealing with American religious history as often as their numbers in the United States would seem to dictate. But even more important, I suggest, is that when Catholics do become the object of study in American academic circles, the questions asked still show the in?uence of the old and supposedly discredited consensus model. Consider the matter of Jay Dolan, professor emeritus of history at Notre Dame. Dolan has long been the dean of American Catholic studies. His booksincluding The Immigrant Church (1975) what Robert Orsi, in a review that appears on the dust cover of Dolan's book, calls "the tense and con?icted but ultimately creative encounter of the church of migrants and immigrants with the challenges and opportunities of American democracy." Dolan's recent book, in other words, is about the >t between Catholicism and American democracy. True, Dolan does provide a more nuanced account of this issue than was done in the heyday of the consensus model. He considers not simply Catholic leaders who opposed democratization of the church in the nineteenth century but also those who promoted democratization, and in the closing chapter he assesses the ways in which Catholic concerns may have shaped American culture since the 1960s. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Dolan frames his discussion of American Catholicism using exactly the same issue-the >t between Catholicism and American democracy-that was so important to Baird, Bacon, Sweet, and others. I am not suggesting that this >t shouldn't be an issue in discussing American Catholicism, but making it the issue-as Dolan does-betrays the lingering in?uence of the supposedly defunct consensus model. To understand why this is so problematic, imagine how we would react if authors writing in the new multiple narratives tradition of religious historiography invariably made ">t with American democracy" the central issue in discussing the Mormons, Sunbelt Jews, Pentecostals, native Americans, and black Americans.
But what most of all demonstrates the continuing presence of the consensus model lurking beneath the stories told by scholars writing in the multiple narratives tradition are the analyses described in earlier chapters of this book. The vast majority of the studies that we have considered in discussing Irish American Catholicism, Italian American Catholicism, Cajun Catholicism, and Hispanic American Catholicism are exactly the sort of studies that commentators like Albanese and Tweed cite as indicative of the new approach to American religion, that is, they are studies that individually provide a localized narrative of some particular group and collectively re?ect the diversity characteristic of the American religious experience. And yet, what we have found in all cases is, >rst of all, that many of the claims made in these narratives-such as Famine immigrants were devout Catholics when they arrived; Italian immigrants were deeply attached to the madonnas and saints associated with their natal villages; Hispanic Catholicism is matricentered-although widely accepted, rest on little or no empirical evidence. We have also found that these narratives have systematically ignored patterns suggesting that the religious practice of many "ethnic" Catholics was more a creative response to their experiences in America than something they brought from their country of origin. Finally, we have found that these two patterns taken together function to construct American Catholicism as an Other that is foreign, passive, and exotic relative to an implicit American Protestant norm. A great many of the studies written in the "new" multiple narratives tradition, in other words, far from undermining the logic of the "old" consensus model, actually reinforce it.
But, if an implicit Protestant norm still lurks beneath the surface of so many studies that are part of the multiple narratives approach, what about the second impulse that, according to commentators like Wilson, has shaped the study of American religion in recent decades, namely, the increasing use of social scienti>c arguments that treat religion as a generic phenomenon? Phrased di=erently, have American social scientists studying religion avoided using the sort of hidden Protestant norm that has structured historical studies of American religion? Un-fortunately, the answer here would seem to be no. Consider >rst, for example, how American psychologists typically measure religion.
Psychologists and Their Measures of Religion
As several commentators have pointed out (Ladd and Spilka 2006; Slater, Hall, and Edwards 2001; Wul= 1997, 233-241 ) the two psychological measures used most often over the past several decades to assess a person's religious orientation are (1) some version of the Intrinsic/Extrinsic (I/E) Scale developed by Gordon Allport (Allport and Ross 1967) or (2) In discussing the I/E Scale, Ralph Hood (1971, 370) provides a succinct account of the di=erence between an extrinsic religious orientation and an intrinsic religious orientation:
While [Allport] never clearly de>ned these terms, it is apparent that the extrinsic dimension was primarily conceived to re?ect an explicit, utilitarian orientation to generally institutionalized aspects of religion while the intrinsic dimension was primarily conceived to re?ect an implicit, personal, "devout" orientation to more experiential aspects of religion.
The underlying conceptualization, in other words, is rooted in the contrast between someone attached to an institutional church for utilitarian (read: sel>sh) reasons and someone with deeply internalized religious beliefs that play an important role in determining how they conduct their life. Given this underlying conceptualization, then, it makes sense that in a widely used version of the I/E Scale (Gorsuch and McPherson 1989) an extrinsic orientation is operationalized as agreement with items like:
-"I go to church because it helps me to make friends." -"I pray mainly to gain relief and protection." -"I go to church mostly to spend time with my friends."
while an intrinsic orientation is operationalized as agreement with items like: -"It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer." -"I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs." -"My whole approach to life is based on my religion."
Although the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction supposedly refers only to two different religious orientations, psychologists studying religion have always, at least implicitly, seen the intrinsic orientation as more positively valued. Allport himself, for example, tells us that he >rst developed the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction in order to disentangle the relationship between religion and prejudice (Allport and Ross 1967, 432) . He argued that, although church attenders are on average more prejudiced than nonattenders, this general >nding masks the fact that a certain subset of attenders-namely, those characterized by an intrinsic orientation-are signi>cantly less prejudiced than people with an extrinsic orientation. Although subsequent research would not always sustain the negative correlation between an intrinsic orientation and prejudice that Allport found in his initial studies, the number of studies which have found this negative correlation, combined with studies (reviewed in Wul= 1997, 234) that have found a correlation between an extrinsic orientation and a wide variety of negatively valued traits (like prejudice, dogmatism, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism), has ensured that the intrinsic orientation was seen to be the "better" sort of religiosity.
Although Wul= (1997, 231-237) and others have criticized the I/E distinction as simplistic, and have seen particular versions of the I/E Scale as tapping into personality variables that have little to do with religion per se (like dogmatism and a desire to look good in the eyes of others), the fact is that the I/E conceptualization and its associated scales are still widely popular. Why? For Wul= himself (1997, 594) , that the I/E Scale "remains popular is testimony both to its conceptual appeal, especially to those who share Allport's wish to preserve genuine piety from the opprobrium attached to religious bigotry, and to the lack of equally convenient alternatives." But if, as Wul= suggests, the I/E distinction is popular because of its "conceptual appeal," we need to ask if that appeal extends beyond a desire on the part of some psychologists to disassociate pure religion (Wul='s "genuine piety") from prejudice. And this again leads us to the issue of Protestant bias.
Christopher Burris (1999, 147) has already suggested that Allport's personal and familial ties to a "North American Protestant articulation of Christianity" undoubtedly in?uenced his conceptualization of the I/E distinction. In the same vein, Cohen, Hall and Meador (2005) have more recently pointed out that the emphasis upon individualism and internalized piety in conceptualizing the morevalued intrinsic orientation re?ects an implicitly Protestant norm and that people belonging to religious traditions that are less individualistic and more given to communal rituals (like Catholicism and Episcopalianism/Anglicanism) would almost certainly score high on the less-valued extrinsic orientation scale. Cohen et al. go on to observe (p. 58) that, while the I/E Scale was "culturally sensible" in the period when it was developed by Allport, "American culture [at that time] retained a signi>cant element of nascent Protestant Christianity," and we have now moved into a post-Christian era that requires a di=erent measure. A quite di=er-ent interpretation, however, but one equally consistent with the data, is that the Protestant norm implicit in the I/E Scale has always made it an inappropriate tool for assessing religion as a generic phenomenon (which is what its proponents claimed it was) and that it became the norm because of its implicit Protestant bias. What makes this alternative explanation all the more plausible is that a similar Protestant norm is implicit in the measures that have been proposed as alternatives to the I/E Scale.
The Quest Scale developed by Batson and his associates has for some years now been almost as popular as the I/E Scale. It was designed to measure "the degree to which an individual's religion involves an open-ended, responsive dialogue with existential questions raised by the contradictions and tragedies of life" (Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis 1993, 168) . The more an individual engages in such an ongoing and open-ended dialogue with existential questions, the higher he or she scores on the Quest Scale. The scale thus implies that a dialogue of this sort is the better sort of religion, which is why investigators using this scale are quite at ease in suggesting that a high score on the Quest Scale can be taken as evidence of religious maturity (see, for example, Leak and Randall 1995) .
The examples that Batson and his associates (1993, (166) (167) (168) present as illustrating a high Quest orientation-they range from Siddhartha to Malcolm X to Mahatma Gandhi-might seem to indicate that the Quest Scale was intended to be applicable well beyond the speci>c case of American Christianity. Even so, one bit of evidence Batson and his associates present suggests-however inadvertently-that the Quest Scale is indeed closely tied to the American Protestant tradition. This evidence appears in the section of their book (pp. 177-179) where the authors respond to the claim, advanced by some critics, that the Quest Scale does not measure anything "religious." To establish the scale's validity, they rely heavily (see pp. 178-179) on a study comparing seminarians at Princeton Theological Seminary with undergraduates at Princeton. Since the seminarians, they argue, are "reasonably identi>able as religious" the fact that they scored higher on the Quest Scale (as they did) is evidence that the scale "is a valid measure of something religious" (p. 178). Only in passing, however, do we learn that the seminarians were all studying for the Presbyterian ministry. Once we know that, we could just as easily argue that the result (that Presbyterian seminarians scored relatively high on the Quest Scale) is evidence that the Quest Scale is a valid measure of the sort of religiosity to which Presbyterians (or, more generally, Protestants) are committed.
Still, what is most revealing of the Protestant norm implicit in the Quest Scale is the content of the items used in the scale. In the version of this scale presented in Batson, Schroenrade, and Ventis (1993, 170) , we >nd items like:
-"I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs." -"For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious." -"I do not expect my religious beliefs to change in the next few years." [re-
verse scored] -"My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions." -"There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing."
What is being conveyed in these statements is not simply an individualistic emphasis of the sort encountered in the I/E Scale (though that emphasis is certainly present) but also the suggestion that challenging received knowledge and thinking for yourself in religious matters is a sign of religious maturity. An emphasis on challenging received tradition, of course, has long been a central element in Protestant perceptions of the Protestant tradition, just as the distinction between blindly obedient and unquestioning Catholics and Protestants who think for themselves without aid of priestly intermediaries has long been a stock element in Protestant critiques of Catholicism.
Moreover, the individualism and willingness to embrace change associated with Protestantism generally are emphases that have long been seen to be especially characteristic of American Protestantism. In 1775, for instance, in his famous speech urging conciliation with the American colonists, Edmund Burke declared:
The people are protestants; and of that kind, which is the most adverse to all implicit submission of mind and opinion. . . . All protestantism, even the most cold and passive, is a sort of dissent. But the religion most prevalent in our Northern Colonies is a re>nement on the principle of resistance; it is the dissidence of dissent, and the Protestantism of the Protestant religion. This religion, under a variety of denominations, agreeing in nothing but in the communion of the spirit of liberty, is predominant in most of the Northern provinces. (Elofson and Woods 1996, 121-122) Burke was referring mainly to Puritanism and its various o=shoots, but, as we saw in Chapter 1, an emphasis on individualism and "thinking for yourself without aid of established authority" became even more central to the American Prot-estant tradition when these emphases (which were part of the revolutionary ethos) were incorporated into the message preached by upstart sects like the Methodists and Baptists in the wake of the Revolution.
Something else central to the forms of evangelical Christianity that became popular in the United States during the nineteenth century was an emphasis upon the conversion experience. This is relevant to the Quest Scale because the essence of the conversion experience, as then articulated by evangelical groups, was a total transformation of the individual involved. Evangelicals in the United States, even more than Christians from other Protestant traditions, saw "embracing change" within the context of the conversion experience as a prerequisite for religious maturity-which is exactly what the Quest Scale now in use also implies.
By contrast, the emphasis on "thinking for yourself" and "embracing change" that is so much a central part of the Protestant stereotype (the American Protestant stereotype in particular) is absent from discussions of the American Catholic tradition. Indeed, as we have seen throughout this book, American religious historians have repeatedly constructed American Catholics as passive and as clinging tightly to beliefs and practices they acquired outside the United States-even when the evidence permits other interpretations. In the end, then, the Quest Scale's emphasis on the individual, on thinking for oneself, and on a willingness to embrace change re?ects an implicit religious norm that is far closer to stereotypes about American Protestantism than to stereotypes about American Catholicism.
The third and >nal measure that I want to consider is the Faith Maturity Scale (FMS) developed by Benson, Donahue, and Erickson (1993) . Although the FMS has not as yet displaced either the I/E Scale or the Quest Scale, it is worth analyzing because it has a Protestant bias that has been acknowledged, but acknowledged in a way that masks the full extent of its bias. Moreover, coming to understand more fully just why the FMS is so much a product of a distinctively Protestant worldview can, I think, serve as a useful step in the development of measures that would be more appropriate in studying, say, American Catholics.
Benson, Donahue, and Erickson were quite up front in saying that in developing the Faith Maturity Scale they >rst consulted with representatives from six mainline Protestant denominations and that the scale was subsequently tested and re>ned using data from surveys administered to samples drawn from each of these six denominations. Moreover, they were also quite clear about what they sought to measure and the ways in which their analysis was, and was not, tied to a distinctively Protestant worldview-and here it is necessary to quote them:
The core dimensions of a mature-faith measure should prominently re?ect the . . . two themes found in most faith traditions, both Christian and non-Christian. One is about the self, including one's personal relationship to God, one's e=orts to seek God, and the personal transformations one experiences in this divine encounter. This theme might be called vertical, agentic, or "love of God" faith. . . . The second theme is about obligation and action on the human plane. It has to do with heeding the call to social service and social justice. While all faith traditions embrace this dimension, it is particularly salient in mainline Protestantism. (Benson, Donahue, and Erickson 1993, 4) .
One result of this conceptualization is that the FMS has two subscales, the FMSVertical (which assesses the "relationship with God" dimension mentioned in this passage) and the FHS-Horizontal (which assesses the "social service and social justice" dimension). Note, however, that while the last line in this passage suggests that the FMS-Horizontal subscale is especially tied to a Protestant worldview, it does not make a similar remark about the FMS-Vertical subscale. Left unexamined is the possibility that the FMS embraces a view of "relating to God" that is also distinctively Protestant. Does it?
Consider some of the items that Benson, Donahue, and Erickson (1993, 19 ) use in their FMS-Vertical subscale:
-"My faith shapes how I think and act each and every day." -"My faith helps me know right from wrong." -"I take time for periods of prayer and meditation." -"I talk with other people about my faith." -"My life is >lled with meaning and purpose." -"I have a real sense that God is guiding me." -"I am spiritually moved by the beauty of God's Creation."
Certainly the emphasis here on the individual, and an individual's deeply internalized faith, might in itself be taken as having a distinctively Protestant ?avor. But what is most distinctively Protestant about the FMS-Vertical, I suggest, is the implicit suggestion that faith and faith alone (to borrow from Luther borrowing from St. Paul) is what most of all establishes and shapes an individual's personal relationship with a transcendent God.
So far, I have sought to demonstrate that there is an implicit Protestant norm structuring contemporary psychologists' study of religion, by looking carefully at the content of the measures psychologists uses to assess religiosity. Another way to uncover that hidden Protestant norm is to imagine how things might be dif-ferent if we approached the study of American religion from a Catholic perspective. To do that, we need to dip into a body of scholarly literature that is very much concerned with how individual Catholics relate to God but which is rarely if ever mentioned by most psychologists (or by most sociologists) studying religion in the United States.
Contrasting the Catholic Imagination and the Protestant Imagination
Some time ago (1967), Guy Swanson argued that a fundamental di=erence between Catholicism and Protestantism had to do with immanence. Catholics, he said, accepted the view that God, or more generally, the sacred, could be immanent in this world. Catholics, in other words, believed not simply that God had created the world and was a continuing and active presence in it (views also embraced by Protestants), but also that God's essence could and did pervade all aspects of the material world. In varying degrees, Protestant groups rejected this last claim. For Swanson, the Catholic belief in immanence and the Protestant rejection of immanence were fundamental, because this distinction was the basis for any number of important doctrinal di=erences between the two traditions, especially those relating to the nature of church, the importance of the sacraments, and the nature of the Eucharist.
Although Swanson limited his analysis to matters of o;cial doctrine, it is not di;cult to come up with examples that show how the di=ering Catholic and Protestant attitudes toward immanence play out in connection with popular practice. The importance of immanence in the European Catholic tradition, for example, can be seen in the central role that cults organized around miraculous images and relics have played in that tradition and in the importance to Catholics of pilgrimage to sites sacralized by the earthly appearance of a madonna or saint. Similarly, the strong rejection of immanence in the Protestant tradition can be seen in the vehemence with which Protestants-acting under the in?uence of the degradation narrative discussed in Chapter 3-rejected these very same things (image cults, relics, pilgrimage).
Some years later (1981), the Catholic theologian David Tracy added to the Swanson argument by asserting that the centrality of immanence in the Catholic tradition and the Protestant rejection of immanence had given rise to two distinct modes of theological thinking. Basically, what Tracy argues is that, because Catholic theologians see the created world as pervaded by the sacred, they are predisposed toward analogical thinking, that is, toward using familiar relationships found in the created world as analogies that can e=ectively convey an understanding of relationship between human beings and God. By contrast, Protestant theologians, who reject immanence, see an "in>nite qualitative di=erence" between God and the created world (Tracy 1981, 415) . Hence, Tracy argues, Protestant theologians are predisposed toward a form of dialectical thinking that emphasizes the preached word, which is God's message to humanity, and the way we react to that word. The result of this perspective is that in Protestant theological thought a person's relationship with God depends most of all on the degree to which that person embraces God's message.
Although Tracy's argument is well known in Catholic intellectual circlesMark Massa (2001, 564) , for example, calls it "one of the seminal works of 20th-century theology"-his discussion is not in any sense rooted in the sort of social scienti>c studies that we have been reviewing in this book. However, in various publications, Andrew Greeley (1994; 1995; 2000; 2004) , a sociologist, has stated that what Tracy calls analogical thinking is in fact characteristic of Catholics generally (and so not just Catholic theologians), and he has marshaled much evidence indicating that, because Catholics are predisposed toward analogical thinking, they relate to God in a manner that is qualitatively di=erent from that of Protestants.
Greeley's basic argument is similar to Tracy's in positing that, because Catholics see God (and the sacred) as immanent in all aspects of the world, they are more likely than Protestants to "think about" God using metaphors drawn from everyday life. Because Catholics see the sacred is immanent in all human relationships, for example, they are more likely to think about God using maternal as well as paternal metaphors. For Greeley, this explains the intense devotion to Mary in the Catholic tradition; he sees the devotion to Mary as simply a way of thinking about God using a maternal metaphor drawn from daily experience.
Mark Massa in turn has used the arguments developed by Tracy and Greeley to provide a fresh perspective on an issue directly relevant to the concerns of this book: the continuing tendency on the part of "many Americans in the media, the academy, and in popular culture [to] perceive Catholicism to be di=erent, perhaps disturbingly di=erent, from the American way of life" (2001, 568), In particular, Massa, following Greeley (2000, 111-135) , argues that, in the Protestant imagination, the in>nite qualitative di=erence seen to exist between God and humanity leads to the view that "human society is both unnatural and oppressive" (2001, 567) . And in the United States, the predominance of this view has always meant a strong concern with protecting the rights of the individual against the oppression of government and social networks. In the Catholic imagination, by contrast, because God is seen to be immanent in the world, human communities are more likely to be seen as both natural and good-with the result that Catholics are less likely to share that distrust of government so central to the Protestant American worldview. It is the absence of this distrust of government, Massa argues, that really explains why Catholics came to be de>ned as the Other in American society.
Finally, Robert Orsi (2005) has added to this literature on immanence and the Catholic imagination in his quasi-autobiographical account of the changes and continuities associated with the American Catholic experience in the last half of the twentieth century. Orsi's special contribution is to point out that we need to study how the sacred becomes immanent for American Catholics. In his words Although Orsi goes on to identify a number of processes that have functioned to make the sacred material for American Catholics, he emphasizes the role played by certain types of physical bodies (p. 74).
The materialization of the religious world includes a process that might be called the corporalization of the sacred. I mean by this the practice of rendering the invisible world visible by constituting it as an experience in a body-in one's own body or in someone else's body-so that the experiencing body itself becomes the bearer of [a sacred] presence for oneself and for others.
In developing this point, Orsi goes on to argue that the visible bodies of young children (like the altar boys assisting a priest at mass; schoolchildren in the pews; young girls dressed up as Our Lady of Fatima), and the bodies of people who were physically crippled or in great pain (like his own uncle Sal, who had cerebral palsy, and Italian stigmatics like Gemma Galgani and Padre Pio) were especially important in determining how American Catholics experienced the sacred.
The Greeley/Tracy/Orsi argument needs work. For example, Greeley's (2004, 135) in-passing remark to the e=ect that analogical thinking was promoted by the sacramental objects and practices common in the pre-Vatican II church, organized as they were around angels, the souls in Purgatory, religious medals, the Stations of the Cross, and the like, might be read as suggesting that analogical think-ing is now less common among American Catholics precisely because the use of such sacramentals has declined over the past few decades. Further, although Orsi (2005) is almost certainly correct in saying that cultic activities commonly associated with the pre-Vatican II era have not died out as completely as is commonly thought, it does seem fair to say that the emphasis on "corporalizing sacredness" in the bodies of young children or su=ering saints and cripples-the emphasis that Orsi sees as having been so central to making the sacred immanent in the visible world-is likely less a part of the American Catholic experience today than it was when Orsi himself was growing up. And, certainly, Catholic commentators like David Carlin (2003) have pointed out that since Vatican II many American Catholic leaders and thinkers have increasingly embraced precisely that emphasis on religious individualism that used to be more uniquely associated with the Protestant tradition.
Nevertheless, even if a belief in immanence and use of the analogical imagination are not as common as they once were among American Catholics, there are still reasonable grounds for asserting that a belief in immanence and the resulting emphasis on analogical thinking promotes a way of relating to God that is really quite di=erent from the way of relating to God that results from the Protestant rejection of immanence and from dialectical thinking. If we now ask what mode of relating to God seems implicit in the items used to construct the most commonly used measures of a person's religious orientation (the I/E Scale, the Quest Scale, the FMS), then clearly it seems a mode closer to the Protestant view, which emphasizes an individual's internalization of God's word, than to the Catholic view, which emphasizes relating to God by the use of metaphors drawn from everyday life or through our experience of children in church, handicapped relatives, su=ering saints, and so on.
Yes, But . . .
One way of responding to the discussion to this point would be to argue that if there are problems with any of the scales that we have been considering, then these problems would become apparent when the scales are assessed for construct validity, reliability, and multidimensionality. And, certainly, there exist a very large number of studies which do assess these scales (especially the I/E Scale and the Quest Scale) in just these terms. Nevertheless, the point that Carol Gilligan (1982) made long ago, I suggest, is still valid: in developing theories, where you start often determines where you end up. In Gilligan's case, this meant that developing a theory of moral reasoning by >rst studying responses elicited from males leads to a theory that is quite di=erent from the one which emerges when you start by studying responses elicited from females. What it means here, I suggest, is that studying religion as a generic process using measures that uniformly rest upon a Protestant vision will likely result in conclusions that are qualitatively di=erent from those that might have been reached had the measures been less dependent upon a distinctively Protestant view.
Unfortunately, there is little basis for believing that the Protestant norm implicit in the measures considered here will be dislodged among academics studying religion in the near future. On the contrary, the I/E Scale, the Quest Scale, and the FMS-Vertical subscale are still popular and still being sold as measures of a generic religiosity that transcends the Protestant case. Moreover, the arguments by Tracy, Greeley, and Orsi on immanence and the analogical imagination, which at least might provide the foundation for developing measures of religiosity that are dramatically di=erent from those currently in use, have been ignored in mainstream psychology of religion. This might be understandable in the case of Tracy and Orsi. Tracy, after all, is a theologian whose "data" consist for the most part of arguments developed by other theologians, so his work is really quite outside the social scienti>c mainstream. As regards Orsi's 2005 work, my own sense is that much of the autobiographical material he presents-though interesting in itselfis too often only very tenuously tied to his theoretical argument and so, if anything, functions to obscure that argument. In any event, since the argument developed in this most recent book goes beyond the arguments made in earlier ones (like 1985 and 1996) , there really has not been enough time for Orsi's work on the Catholic imagination to have had a major impact on the academic study of religion.
Greeley, however, is a di=erent matter. For decades now, Andrew Greeleyquite apart from his status as an active priest and best-selling novelist-has been one of the most visible scholars working in the sociology of religion, and his many (many) articles and books are widely cited by psychologists of religion. Wul='s (1997) textbook, for example, which is likely the most widely used in this area, mentions several of Greeley's studies. In each case, however, the study is cited by Wul= only because of some particular empirical >nding it reports; Greeley's theoretical arguments on the Catholic imagination have simply been ignored.
In the end, then, not only are there grounds for suggesting that the measures of religiosity commonly used by psychologists of religion continue to rest upon an implicitly Protestant view of the sacred, but also that a body of literature which might be used to challenge this situation, and which is highly visible among Catholic intellectuals in the United States, has been steadfastly ignored.
But what about sociology? Have American sociologists been able to transcend the implicit Protestant norm that continues to structure the academic study of religion in psychology? Unfortunately, no.
The Sociology of Religion
While the study of religion is by no means a central disciplinary concern within the American sociological establishment, it is a subject that continues to attract the attention of a great many sociologists. There are, for example, a number of specialty journals devoted to the sociological study of religion (the two most important of which are the Journal for the Scienti>c Study of Religion and Sociology of Religion), and at least a few articles on religion regularly appear in top-ranked sociology journals like the American Sociological Review and the American Journal of Sociology. Moreover, more than >ve hundred sociologists are members of the Sociology of Religion Section of the American Sociological Association (ASA)-which puts this section right about in the middle (in terms of membership) of the forty or so sections in the ASA (Wuthnow 2003, 18) .
It is conventional, in accounts that discuss the intellectual origins of the sociology of religion, to trace those origins back to the often-referenced "Founding Fathers" (and they were all fathers) of sociology itself; but the precise list of these progenitors varies a bit from one commentator to the next (compare, for Most (but not all) commentators put Marx on the list, and a few (but only a few) list Freud and Simmel as well. But the only two names that appear on everybody's list are Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. Unfortunately, the often-made claim that Weber and Durkheim laid the foundations for the sociological study of religion, at least if we are talking speci>cally about the sociology of religion in the United States, is simultaneously correct and misleading.
While the study of religion was certainly a central concern of both Durkheim and Weber during their lifetimes, their works on religion in fact had little e=ect on American sociologists at the time. Connell's (1997) careful study of the published work of leading American sociologists in the early twentieth century, for example, suggests that while early American sociologists had a passing familiarity with the work of Durkheim and Weber, these two authors were not then singled out as being especially important. As Connell and others (e.g., Collins 2006) point out, it was only during the 1940s and 1950s, mainly through the e=orts of in?uential sociologists like Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton, and C. Wright Mills, that Durkheim and Weber came to be seen as the founders of sociology and that their works, including those on religion, came to be required reading in sociology.
On the other hand, even granting that Durkheim and Weber did not rise to prominence in American sociology until the 1940s and 1950s, it is undeniably the case that, over the past several decades, acquiring a familiarity with their core arguments has been a rite of passage for graduate students training to be sociologists. Given this, it is important to point out (at least given the concerns of this chapter) that in their best-known and most widely read theoretical formulations about religion, Weber and Durkheim both privileged Protestantism.
This privileging of Protestantism is, of course, easiest to see in the case of Weber. After all, his best-known work on religion, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1905 Capitalism ( /1996 , associates Protestantism with nothing less than modernity and economic progress. Thus, in Weber's formulation, Lutheranism gave an impetus to the development of modern European capitalism by suggesting that secular callings (e.g., being a merchant) could be as morally legitimate as any other calling-an attitude which Weber very explicitly contrasted with the medieval (read: Catholic) view that involvement with the world put your immortal soul at risk. But even more importantly, Weber argued that the anxiety generated by the Calvinist doctrine of predestination gave rise to the "spirit of capitalism," which for Weber was a set of values (including a commitment to the rational pursuit of pro>t, the view that individuals had a moral obligation to make a pro>t, that spending money for personal pleasure was wrong) that was an essential precondition for economic progress. What all this means, as John McGreevy (2003) points out, is that when Talcott Parsons set about championing and popularizing Weber's argument, Parsons became the very >rst American sociologist to endorse the quintessentially Protestant claim that the Reformation, by breaking with the Catholic tradition, had marked a turning point (and a progressive move forward) for the modern West.
The privileging of Protestantism in Durkheim's work is a bit harder to see. After all, one of the central claims in Suicide (1897/1951) is that Catholics are less prone to suicide than Protestants-which hardly seems to put Catholicism in a bad light. But here we must keep in mind how Durkheim (pp. 157-158) explains the lower suicide rate among Catholics: he credited it to higher levels of social solidarity deriving from the Catholic Church's suppression of individualism and free inquiry and the church's corresponding insistence that all members hold precisely the same beliefs and engage in the same rituals. Durkheim's emphasis on "common values and rituals" is signi>cant because of the argument he had developed earlier, in The Division of Labor in Society (1893/1933), which-like Suicideis still required reading in most classical theory courses in sociology.
In the >rst half of The Division of Labor, Durkheim suggests that societies can be arrayed along a social evolutionary sequence that starts with societies bound together by the solidarity produced by common values and ritual and ends with modern societies that are bound together by the solidarity that derives from the mutual interdependence occasioned by a societal division of labor. Within the logic of The Division of Labor, in other words, an emphasis on common values and rituals, and a corresponding deemphasis on individualism, is the hallmark of a more "primitive" form of social organization. The result of this reasoning is that when Suicide is read against the social evolutionary argument developed in The Division of Labor, what Suicide does is suggest very clearly that Catholicism, by virtue of its strong emphasis on common values and rituals, is a far more primitive form of religion than Protestantism. Basically, then, both Weber and Durkheim-albeit in slightly di=erent waysdeveloped arguments that imported into the sociology of religion that same social evolutionary premise (that Catholicism is a more primitive form of religion, or if you prefer, that Protestantism is a more advanced form of religion) that scholars like Hall and Starr had imported into the psychology of religion.
On the other hand, although what Durkheim and Weber wrote about religion is still required reading in sociology, and so likely continues to contribute to a mindset that privileges Protestantism, the particular theoretical arguments they developed have increasingly been set aside, at least by American sociologists of religion, in favor of arguments that on the surface seem quite di=erent from the arguments that Durkheim and Weber developed. A careful examination of these newer arguments, however, reveals that they too privilege Protestantism.
The Rise of Rational Choice Theory
Writing in the late 1980s, Robert Wuthnow (1988) concluded his assessment of the sociology of religion with this summary judgment:
In viewing the sociology of religion as a whole many signi>cant developments have obviously taken place over the past several decades; yet it appears regrettable that the >eld has grown more rapidly in inductive research and in subspecializations than in attempts to identify theoretically integrative concepts.
Basically, as I read his article, what Wuthnow was saying is that, while sociologists of religion had established what does and does not correlate with religion in a variety of empirical studies (with maybe a few words of ad hoc theorizing thrown in at the end) and had increasingly turned their attention to religious phenomena previously ignored (like the study of new religious movements), they had done little to advance the theoretical understanding of religion as a generic social process. In retrospect, however, we know that Wuthnow made this assessment at the beginning of a period during which sociologists of religion became increasingly concerned with theoretical matters. In particular, over the past two decades, sociologists of religion have been drawn into a debate over which of two speci>c theoretical paradigms is best suited for the study of religion.
The >rst of these theoretical paradigms is usually called "secularization theory," and its central contention is that religion will decline as modernity advances. This, of course, is an old argument and very much a part of the theorizing done by Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and other classical theorists. Although most commentators (see, for example, Gorski 2003b, 111) believe that secularization theory emerged during the early nineteenth century in the works of SaintSimon and Comte, Grace Davie (2003, 69) is likely correct in suggesting that, at least to some extent, its roots are in the medieval idea that both the church and its authority are maintained by formal and informal sanctions that would be threatened by religious pluralism.
While secularization theory is likely still the dominant perspective in Europe, its popularity in the United States has waned. Davie (2003, 68) calls Stephen Warner's (1993) article assessing theoretical trends in the sociology of religion "a watershed in American understandings of their own society," because it signaled an increasing awareness among American sociologists that the older secularization thesis, whatever its applicability to Europe might be, could not be taken for granted in the American case. What has increasingly come to replace secularization theory in the United States is the theory of religious economies developed by Rodney Stark and a variety of associates (Finke 1990; Finke and Stark 1988; Finke and Stark 2003; Stark and Finke 2000; Stark and Iannaccone 1991) . Stark and Finke (2000) de>ne the theory of religious economies in terms of several dozen propositions and de>nitions which they use to explain religious phenomena. Most simply, however, their core argument is this:
Religious economies are like commercial economies in that they consist of a market made up of a set of current and potential customers and set of >rms seeking to serve that market. The fate of those >rms will depend upon (1) aspects of their organizational structure, (2) their sales representatives, (3) their product, and (4) Moreover, Stark et al. have always been quite clear about which religious doctrines (the "product" mentioned above) they think will sell best in an unregulated religious economy: ones that require their adherents to maintain at least a moderate level of "tension" with their environment (see especially Stark and Finke 2000, 193-217) . What they mean by this is that the most appealing sort of religion will be religion that requires at least a moderate level of self-sacri>ce on the part of its adherents. In explaining why this will be the most appealing sort of religion, Stark et al. posit that, if people pay a relatively high price for membership, they will believe that the rewards to be gained from membership will be high. In Stark's (2003, 20) words, "religions that ask more from their members are thereby enabled to give them more-in worldly as well as spiritual rewards."
The theory of religious economies has had an enormous in?uence on the sociological study of religion in the United States. Randall Collins (1997) >nds the Stark et al. theory to be "a landmark in the sociology of religion," just as works by Durkheim and Weber were landmarks in an earlier period. In part, the tremendous success of this newer theory derives from the body of evidence Stark and his associates have amassed in support of the theory (see Stark and Finke 2000, for an overview of this evidence). The theory has its critics, of course, who themselves have collected evidence that key predictions from the theory are generally unsupported (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Gorski 2003b) . Even so, the debate over the Stark et al. theory has become increasing central to the discipline-as anyone familiar with the three specialty journals devoted to the sociology of religion in the United States 4 will know.
For example, in 1999 Skerkat and Ellison (378) stated that the debate over the theory of religious economies had become the single most visible debate in the sociology of religion. Furthermore, Thomas Robbins (2001) was, and is, almost certainly correct in characterizing the theory as "the biggest game in town," because it has come to overshadow completely all possible competitors. The Stark et al. theory now likely shapes the way American sociologists think about religion more than any other single sociological theory. In what follows, then, I want to show two things: (1) that the theory of religious economies (just like the I/E Scale, the Quest Scale, etc.) rests upon a conceptualization of religion that is implicitly Protestant, and (2) that the Protestant conceptualization underlying this theory has warped Stark and others' understanding of American religion, the one case that for many people is the case where the theory works best.
The Power of the Word
In reviewing Stark and Finke's Acts of Faith, Robbins (2001, 334) declares that the theory of religious economies "entails a distinctly cognitivist or objectivist theory of religion, in which beliefs [emphasis in original] about God(s) take center stage." Robbins then goes on to contrast this theory to theoretical perspectives that emphasize "rituals or feelings" in the study of religion. While I think that Robbins's remarks here are insightful, I suggest that his conclusion is only partly correct. In fact, Stark and his associates do not usually investigate the actual beliefs that individuals hold. On the contrary, as Stark and Finke themselves made clear in the passage cited above, what is of central importance to the theory of religious economies are the messages-that is, the formal doctrines and creeds-that religious organizations market to the public. One result is that there is little or no room in the theorizing by Stark et al. for the possibility of a signi>cant discrepancy between the o;cial doctrines and creeds of a religious organization and the actual beliefs (and/or behaviors) of its members. Consider, for example, Stark's most recent work, which-though not about American religion per se-provides an especially clear demonstration of this problem. Stark (2001b; 2003) starts with the premise that European Christians, both Protestants and Catholics, have been committed to a belief in an omnipotent God who is rational, responsible, and dependable and to the belief that the universe was created by this God. Stark then goes on to argue that this belief structure has been responsible for some of the master patterns in European history, including the rise of modern science, witch hunts, and the elimination of slavery. At the level of formal theological doctrine, of course, Stark is absolutely correct-this is the vision of God embraced by both Catholic and Protestant theologians. What Stark assumes, however, without presenting any supporting evidence whatsoever, is that these formal theological positions have been consciously held by the individuals (anti-slavery activists, scientists, witch hunters) he is studying. Ignored entirely, in other words, is the possibility that non-theologians have thought about God in ways di=erent from those prescribed in formal doctrine. Also ignored is a possibility that will be obvious to anyone familiar with the history of European Catholicism, namely, that for ordinary Catholics, including many Catholic intellectuals, Mary and the saints have been far more central to the experience of religion than the omnipotent God postulated in formal Catholic doctrine-which in turn suggests that popular beliefs about Mary and the saints have likely been more important in shaping Catholic attitudes than the doctrines relating to God that are so important in Stark's analysis.
If there is an emphasis on formal doctrine and creed in the theorizing by Stark and his associates, where does it come from? I suggest that it derives from the sort of "dialectical thinking" which David Tracy found to be pervasive in Protestant theology and which Andrew Greeley has suggested is the de>ning characteristic of the Protestant imagination (see the discussion earlier in this chapter). What Stark et al., have done, in other words, is to take a Protestant theological orientation (what matters most is how people react to God's revealed message) and morphed it into a theoretical argument (what matters most in studying religion is the e=ect that formal doctrine and creeds, seen as coming from God, have on human behavior). The problem with this essentially Protestant orientation, whatever its value as a theological position, is that it can so easily lead us astray as we try to understand the lived experience of religion in particular contexts. And this, as I will now argue, is precisely what happened in Finke and Stark's The Churching of America (1992) , a work that is still routinely held up (see, for example, Ebaugh 2002) as demonstrating that the "religious economies" approach is especially well-suited to the American case.
Just How Strict Were the Baptists and Methodists?
In The Churching of America (1992) , Finke and Stark use their "high tension sells best" argument to explain some of the master patterns in American religious history. Why did the Methodists and Baptists become so popular in the aftermath of the American Revolution, at the expense of other (and older) Protestant denominations? This occurred largely, they say, because the Revolution led to disestablishment of the state church (and so to an unregulated religious economy) and because the Methodists and Baptists, with their strictures against dancing, drunkenness, public brawling, and so forth, required sacri>ces not required by other denominations. And why did the Methodists lose ground to the Baptists in the latter part of the nineteenth century? Finke and Stark >nd that it was at least partly because the Methodists, but not the Baptists, abandoned the sort of high-tension religion that they had helped pioneer a century earlier. But where is the evidence that the Baptists and (early) Methodists were so strict? In fact, the only "evidence" that Finke and Stark present is that Baptist and Methodist clergy preached selfcontrol. Finke and Stark provide no evidence bearing on the one issue that is central to their argument: the degree to which the people who ?ocked to hear these sermons chose to exercise such self-control in their daily life. This criticism might seem to be academic pettifogging, I grant, except that there is a body of evidence, which has been available for some time, indicating that during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there was often a gap between what was preached by evangelical ministers and the actual behavior of evangelical Christians.
For example, based upon his analysis of a variety of sources, including private journals and diaries, Grady McWhinney (1988, 171-192) concludes that in the U.S. South many evangelicals were in fact fairly lackadaisical about such things as attending preaching services or sending their children to Sunday school, and that when they did attend church services, they often exhibited a level of gaiety that o=ended northern visitors. Why? Because, says McWhinney (p. 189) "the way to heaven, as explained by most preachers and accepted by most southerners, was simple enough-one only had to believe in the divinity of Jesus and to be baptized." This response hardly seems consistent with the claim by Stark et al. that the success of evangelical sects rested upon the fact that members were required to renounce pleasure.
Ted Ownby's (1990) Subduing Satan covers much the same ground as McWhinney but with greater theoretical sophistication. Ownby starts with an observation that is commonly made by historians studying southern culture (Lindman 2000; Lyerly 1998): in the South the evangelical emphasis on self-sacri>ce and renunciation of physical pleasure (which was certainly there at the level of preached creed) was most problematic for males since it was so much at odds with the traditional model of masculinity, which rested upon public displays of physical prowess and participation in activities like drinking, horseracing, cock>ghting, card playing, and so on. What Ownby goes on to show, however, is that, at least in the rural South, forms of social organization developed which moderated the tension that existed between the formal demands of evangelical Christianity and traditional masculinity. This was done, >rst, by making the home the sacred center of religious life and so implying that activities outside the home might be a little less evangelically upstanding than activities in the home. Hunting, for example, always conducted at some distance from the home, routinely provided evangelical males with a "space" in which they could be aggressive, boisterous, andquite often-drunk. Accommodation was even made in the local church: men were allocated a separate section of the church, so that they could come in late (after socializing out front) and could engage in masculine behaviors (like spitting on the ?oor) during church services. Males also dominated the public squares in small towns, and here too, Ownby points out, they often engaged in some decidedly nonevangelical behaviors, especially during the extended Christmas season. Ownby's (1990, 167) summary of his argument goes like this:
The institutions of evangelical culture [in the South] allowed men outlets from a normally strict moral code. Both men and women expected men to adhere more closely to evangelical values inside the home than outside it. The church allowed men to slink into the building at the last minute, to sit on their own sides of the building and to spit tobacco. The revival meeting allowed open sinners-most of them men-to make a periodic statement of repentance, even if they tended not to live up to their momentary commitments.
On balance, it might have been true that evangelicals were more likely to engage in renunciatory activities than nonevangelicals, and this might be enough to save the Finke-Stark argument. The point, however, is that, in focusing on preached creed rather than on actual behaviors, they are ignoring what their own theorizing would otherwise suggest they need to focus on: the degree to which ordinary Baptists and Methodists engaged in the sort of impulse control that supposedly made membership in the upstart sects valuable. But if Finke and Stark's focus on preached creed introduces possible distortions into their account of evangelical Protestantism, it does signi>cantly more damage to their analysis of Irish American Catholicism
The Catholic Connection Finke and Stark (1992, 136) claim that during the nineteenth century American Catholicism was for all practical purposes an "Irish sect movement." They go on to explain that the religion which Irish Catholic immigrants brought with them after 1850 was the Catholicism that had risen to prominence in Ireland as a result of the devotional revolution described by Larkin (whose work Finke and Stark cite). This was, they argue, a type of Catholicism that was as strict as anything associated with the Baptists and Methodists and so, for that reason, popular. In their own words (1992, 138):
Without pausing to explore the cause of the Irish devotional revolution here, we may note that this revolution spread to America with successive waves of Irish immigrants (Larkin, 1972) . And in combination with the immense predominance of Finke and Stark then go on to list a variety of Catholic prohibitions associated with sex, divorce, contraception, Lenten practice, and so on.
As far as it goes, Finke and Stark's characterization of Catholic doctrine during this period is quite on the mark. As we saw in Chapter 2, the Catholicism being marketed by ultramontantist clergy in the nineteenth century (both in the United States and Ireland) was every bit as strict as Finke and Stark say. Furthermore, in Ireland itself this sort of Catholicism did become popular in the wake of the Famine-though whether that was because it was strict (which is the Finke-Stark argument) or because its values were congruent with the values of the tenant farmer class (which, remember, was Eugene Hyne's argument; see Chapter 2) is a matter of debate. Even so, where the Finke-Stark argument clearly fails is as an explanation of Irish Catholicism in America.
As a start, and as pointed out in Chapter 2, it was Larkin's contention that the devotional revolution occurred in Ireland largely because this was the sort of Catholicism that had long been favored by the well-o= tenant farmer class and because the Famine shifted Ireland's demographic pro>le so that this group became more prominent. The Famine, in other words, disproportionately killed o= or drove o= those nominal Irish Catholics who were not committed to this sort of Catholicism. This is why, for Larkin, the Irish immigrants who arrived in the United States in the wake of the Famine would not have been especially good Catholics (which, as the material reviewed in Chapter 2 suggests, was in fact true).
Partly then, the Irish case is instructive because it poses puzzles for the theory of religious economies. For example, if indeed it is true that a general emphasis on "strictness" is what makes a religious message appealing, then why was the strict Catholicism promoted by Cardinal Cullen in Ireland appealing to only one particular stratum (well-o= tenant farmers) but not to others (for example, the great mass of landless laborers)? And why did Irish immigrants, who had not found this sort of strict Catholicism to be especially appealing in Ireland, embrace it with such gusto once they were in the United States? And why was this "strict" sort of Catholicism so appealing to Irish immigrants but not to Italian immigrants? One answer to all these questions, of course, is that Stark et al. are wrong, that strictness is not a variable that anywhere and everywhere makes a religious message valuable, and that each of these patterns has to be explained in some other way (for instance, in terms of the a;nity between religious values and class interests, which is the sort of argument developed earlier in this book).
Still, as with the other arguments considered in this chapter, I am less concerned with the empirical adequacy of the Finke-Stark theory than with the ways in which the Protestant underpinnings of this theory structure the research proc-ess. The implicitly Protestant emphasis in the theory of religious economies on the "content of religious messages" as being the critical element in explaining religion predisposes us to ignore questions (like "Just how strict were the Methodists and Baptist?" and "Were the Famine Irish in fact good Catholics?") that might otherwise lead to a more nuanced understanding of religion America. But there's more: I now want to argue that the implicitly Protestant emphasis on "message" in The Churching of America caused Finke and Stark to see patterns in their data that were not there. Consider, for example, their account of the increase in Baptist and Methodist "market share" in the wake of the Revolution.
The Torrential Increase That Wasn't Using the theory of religious economies, Finke and Stark (1992) posited that, when churches in the American colonies were established, ministers had little incentive to craft the sort of high-tension messages that sell well, and so membership rates should have been low. And, indeed, their analysis shows that in 1776 the "adherence rate" (= percent of the general population, including children, that belonged to some religious group) was only 17 percent. With disestablishment, however, all this changed: the religious market was thrown wide open, and Methodists and Baptists-"upstart sects"-gained in popularity precisely because their ministers did craft and promote forms of high-tension religion. But, if we look carefully at Finke and Stark's discussion of Methodist and Baptist success, we >nd that they are saying more than simply that these groups gained a larger share of the religious marketplace. Generally, the imagery invoked in their discussion conveys the impression that the success of the upstart sects following disestablishment occasioned a rise in the adherence rate that was abrupt and steep. They write (p. 15), for example, that "by the start of the Civil War," the original 17 percent adherence rate "had risen dramatically, to 37 percent" (emphasis added). They later (pp. 56-59) describe Methodist and Baptist growth following disestablishment as "torrential." They also mention (p. 104) the "Methodist miracle of growth between 1776 and 1850" (emphasis added). But do the data they present really support the imagery they invoke? Do the data really show an increase in the membership rate that is dramatic, torrential, and miraculous? No.
In their Figure 1 .2, Finke and Stark (1992, 16 ) present a bar graph giving adherence rates 5 for the period 1776 through 1980. In fact, however, it presents the adherence rate for 1776 and then the one for 1850. The rate for 1776, in other words, is the only rate reported for any of the years during which the American religious marketplace was noncompetitive, and there is no data on any of the years between 1776 and 1850-an omission that is easy to miss, because their graph places the years used as charting points at equal intervals even though the intervals between the selected years are in fact not equal. The problem should be evident in Table 7 , which presents the Stark-Finke data on adherence rates over the period . On the one hand, these data do show that adherence rates increased over the century and a half following the Revolution. But remember, the imagery in Finke and Stark's discussion suggests that the rush to the upstart sects following disestablishment was sudden and dramatic, and these data simply do not support this interpretation. Quite the contrary, what these data show (see third column) is that, in the >rst seventy->ve years following the Revolution, adherence rates rose from 17 percent to 34 percent, for an absolute increase of 17 percent, while in the next seventy->ve years, adherence rates rose from 34 percent to 56 percent, for an absolute increase of 22 percent. This move looks more like a pattern of steady, linear growth. Still, if there is evidence of an "upsurge" in the Finke-Stark data, clearly that upsurge occurred in the second half of the period being surveyed, not in the >rst.
If there is no evidence in the data of a sudden and abrupt upsurge in adherence rates in the wake of the Revolution, which is what Finke and Stark assert in their discussion, where does that imagery come from? I suggest that it is a distortion that ?ows easily from the emphasis on "message" that is part of the Protestant imagination. Simply: if it is God's message that counts most of all in attracting adherents, and if the most appealing message is the sort of high-tension message that demands renunciation, then it only makes sense that there would be a torrential increase in Baptist and Methodist market share (and so a general increase in the adherence rate) fairly immediately, that is, as soon as possible after disestablishment gave Baptist and Methodist ministers the opportunity to preach that message to the public. Because the logic of Finke and Stark's implicitly Protestant orientation led to the expectation that there should have been a torrential increase in the membership of the upstart sects immediately following disestablishment, they reported such an increase even though it wasn't present in their own data. I have given The Churching of America close consideration because it is regularly cited as one of the most successful applications of the theory of religious economies and because it is devoted entirely to the study of American religion. But Protestant in?uence can also be detected in other works in the religious economies tradition. The theory that strictness leads to an increase in religious commitment has generated a large number of studies, many (likely most) of which assess this claim using data drawn from contemporary American congregations (see Olson and Perl 2005 for a review of this literature). Yet, in examining these "strictness" studies, we continue to >nd that same emphasis on the "preached word" that pervades the work done by Finke and Stark.
In two studies, for example, Olson and Perl (2001; 2005) assess the "strictness" hypothesis using data from Hoge et al. 's (1996) Obviously, what this question assesses, and so what is central to the Olson and Perl studies, is the degree of strictness preached in the congregations being studied. Olson and Perl, of course, cannot be held responsible for the design of someone else's survey; the point, however, is that they see nothing problematic about the emphasis on the preached word in the Hoge et al. study.
I might note that in the original Hoge et al. study, a second questionnaire was sent out to a sample of 10,903 lay members of the congregations being studied. Unlike the questionnaire sent to pastors, this questionnaire contained no items about strictness, that is, no items that asked members about the degree to which they actually abstained from things like alcohol and gambling. One reason for this omission, it would appear, is that the original Hoge et al. analysis was concerned entirely with correlating what was preached with the levels of >nancial giving. Hoge and his associates, in other words, also took an emphasis on the preached word-and the lack of concern with actual behavior in regard to what is preached-as entirely unproblematic.
But an emphasis on the preached word is not the only element of the Protestant imagination that has shaped the theoretical arguments developed by rational choice theorists. Consider the sort of person seen by rational choice theorists as inhibiting religious growth, that is, the sort of person who makes a particular congregation downright unappealing in the religious marketplace.
The Free Rider "Problem"
In a well-known article that has provoked a lively debate among American sociologists, Laurence Iannaccone (1994) developed a slightly di=erent version of the "strictness makes a church popular" argument advanced by other rational choice theorists (including Stark). Iannaccone took as his starting point an argument developed by Dean Kelley (1972 Kelley ( /1977 . Kelley had noted that conservative Protestant denominations were growing faster than mainline (liberal) Protestant denominations. He then explained this by hypothesizing that "the business of religion is meaning" (p. 38) and that people have a "craving for ultimate meaning [that is] very deep and ancient in human experience" (p. 155). Conservative churches are appealing, Kelley argued, because of their strictness, by which he meant a strong insistence that they alone have the truth, an intolerance of dissent, a clear sense of which lifestyle behaviors are appropriate and which are not, etc. This strictness provides meaning to people in a way that non-strict (liberal) churches do not. What Iannaccone sought to do, he tells us (p. 1181), was to "embed Kelley's thesis within a much broader rational choice approach to religion." And, as Joseph Tamney (2005) has noted, Iannaccone did this by introducing something that was not at all a part of Kelley's original argument: the idea of "free riders," by which Iannaccone meant people who attend church services and make use of church resources (like pastoral counseling and the fellowship of church members) but who themselves contribute little if anything in the way of money or volunteer e=ort.
Free riders are problematic for a congregation, Iannaccone (1994 Iannaccone ( , 1184 argues, because their mere presence dilutes a group's resources, reducing the average level of participation, enthusiasm, energy, and the like. Heterogeneity can thus undermine intense fellowship and major undertakings. Lacking a way to identify and exclude free riders, highly committed people end up saddled with anemic resource-poor congregations.
And "anemic resource-poor" congregations hold little appeal to new members.
But free riders can be driven out (and kept out) of a congregation-and this is the core of Iannaccone's argument-by the personal costs associated with strictness, that is, by the costs associated with strict behavioral codes, strict rules about whom one may and may not socialize with, and so forth. With free riders driven out, says Iannaccone, the members who remain in strict congregations will be highly committed and more than willing to contribute both their time and their money in support of the congregation's communal activities. The result is that strict congregations are resource-rich, and so, choosing to join a strict congregation (or so Iannaccone's argument goes) is very much a "rational choice" because it allows access to those resources.
There has been an ongoing reaction to Iannaccone's argument in the sociology of religion that shows no signs of abating. Some scholars have focused on conceptual issues by pointing out (among other things) that, although Iannaccone begins by citing Kelley's work on the growth of conservative churches, Iannaccone himself includes no measure of growth in his analysis (Marwell 1996) . More usually, however, scholars have tried to assess the empirical adequacy of Iannaccone's argument. Daniel Olson and Paul Perl have amassed evidence demonstrating that members in strict congregations do contribute more time and money than members in non-strict congregations (Olson and Perl 2001) and that strictness does drive out free riders (Olson and Perl 2005) . On the other hand, Joseph Tamney (2005) has presented data indicating that there is no relationship between the perceived number of free riders in a congregation and the availability to other members in that congregation of collective rewards, and also that, while there may indeed be a correlation between strictness and church growth in certain contexts, that correlation is spurious, not causal. Finally, it seems clear that even in the U.S. context, strictness is not a necessary condition for growth. Robert Wuthnow and Wendy Cadge (2004), for example, in their own comment on Iannaccone's argument, point out that Buddhism has become more appealing in the United States in recent years even though most Buddhist groups are de>nitely not strict in Iannaccone's sense.
It is not my intent here to sort through the various studies available to determine if, on balance, Iannaccone's argument is more supported than undermined (or vice versa) by the available evidence. My concern instead is with the idea that was central to Iannaccone's original argument, an idea that has clearly resonated well with theorists, including Stark (see for example Stark and Finke 2000, 147-150) , working within the rational choice tradition: the presence of free riders in a congregation is a "problem."
Whatever "free rider" might mean in the area of economic theory generally, what it means in the religious arena (at least in formulations by rational choice theorists like Iannaccone) sounds suspiciously like the sort of person that the upstart sects in the postrevolutionary period excluded from full membership: someone who has not truly undergone that sort of conversion experience which established a deeply internalized and personal relationship with God and who consequently was not yet committed to devoting their life fully and completely to the pursuit of the Christian ideal (however that might be de>ned in the congregation involved). What I am suggesting, in other words, is that scholars like Iannaccone and Stark have taken an early evangelical Protestant ideal, in this case the belief that the best sort of congregation is a congregation consisting of highly committed members willing to focus their life (and their money) on the singleminded pursuit of their vision of the desired Christian condition, and have transformed this ideal into a sociological theory, namely, that congregations generally (whether Protestant or not) must >nd ways of eliminating free riders in order to ?ourish in the religious marketplace.
This concern with the "problem" of free riders is still very much a part of the rational choice tradition. Brewer et al. (2006) , for example, suggest-contra Iannaccone and others-that "market share" is critical to understanding the presence of free riders. Their core argument is that relatively large congregations are more likely to be seen as o=ering the social connections and social in?uence that free riders crave. Still, the point I want to make here is that Brewer et al. start their article by saying that "free riders can be a problem" (p. 389) and then go on to explain why be giving the sort of reasons that rational choice theorists always give. Thus, they argue, free riders have little or no interest in ministry and faith and so don't contribute money, and they are interested mainly (or only) in being part of a social network. As in the formulations by Iannaccone and Stark, de>ning free riders as a problem serves to reinforce an essentially evangelical vision of what a good (i.e., not problematic) member is. Notice, >nally, that someone approaching the same material with the Catholic imagination-with its emphasis on immanence and so on the view that human relationships can be a metaphor for a relationship with God-might well see the "free rider's" concern with being part of a social network in a more positive light.
But if the Protestant imagination can be detected in the emphasis on the preached word which pervades studies done in the religious economies tradition as well as the claims made by rational choice theories about "free riders," it can also be detected in something else that has increasingly become important to rational choice theorists: the particular sort of relationship with a particular sort of God that makes religion matter.
The Right Kind of Relationship with the Right Kind of God
In recent publications, Stark (2001b; 2003; 2004) has advanced two interrelated claims. The >rst of these is that Durkheim had things backwards: whereas as Durkheim believed that ritual, not a belief in gods, was the sociologically signi>cant element in religion, the reverse is true. Stark's contention is that the internalized beliefs we have about gods, not the rituals that we perform collectively, loom largest in the social experience of religion in all cultures. Stark's second contention is that, although gods of some sort are found in every religious tradition, it is only when people believe in a certain type of god that religion reinforces the moral order. And in his presidential address to the Society for the Scienti>c Study of Religion (2004, 470) , Stark made clear what sort of god this was:
Gods can lend sanctions to the moral order only if they are concerned about, informed about, and act on behalf of humans. Moreover, to promote virtue among humans, gods must be virtuous-they must favour good over evil. Finally, gods will be e=ective in sustaining moral precepts, the greater their scope-that is, the greater the diversity of their powers and the range of their in?uence. All-powerful, all-seeing gods ruling the entire universe are the ultimate deterrent.
At one level, of course, the sort of god described by Stark here (an all-powerful god who wants people to follow a moral code) is indeed the sort of god found not only in Christianity (in both its Protestant and Catholic variants) but also in Islam and Judaism; and so, at >rst sight there might not seem to be anything distinctly Protestant about this conceptualization. A Protestant connection, however, shows up when we look carefully at how Stark tests his theory. Using survey data from a variety of Western nations (where Christianity, Judaism, or Islam prevails), Stark (2001a; 2003, 371-376; 2004) assesses the link between God and morality by correlating answers to the question "How important is God in your life?" with a variety of questions designed to reveal attitudes towards behaviors (e.g., buying goods known to be stolen) that violate established moral precepts. In the end, what is important in Stark's argument is not simply that one believe in an all-powerful god but the degree to which you as an individual embrace that god and make that god an important element in your life. What becomes central to Stark's conceptualization in this recent work is exactly that same emphasis upon an individual's direct and unmediated relationship with an all-powerful (read: transcendent) god, and on the degree to which we embrace the message (moral codes) seen as coming from this god, which David Tracy found to be the de>ning element of the Protestant imagination.
As far as I can tell, Stark's more recent work on monotheism has not yet in-?uenced the sociology of religion in the way that the theory of religious economies generally has. Still, given an American society increasingly concerned with the connections between religion and political behavior, and given Stark's visibility in the >eld, I suspect that his recent message-which is that religion will reinforce morality only if individuals follow the evangelical Protestant model and develop an unmediated relationship with an all-powerful god-is a message that will (dare I say it?) sell well and only further cement in place the implicit Protestant norm that continues to structure the theorizing done by so many American sociologists studying American religion.
